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Resumen 
 
La automatización industrial posa desafíos de gobernanza por su capacidad de producir 
desempleo y desigualdad a largo plazo. La segregación ocupacional por género sitúa a las 
mujeres en los sectores productivos con mayor riesgo de ser robotizados. Instituciones 
internacionales como la Organización Internacional del Trabajo, la Comisión de las Naciones 
Unidas por el Estatus de las Mujeres, y el Foro Económico Mundial han formulado 
propuestas de política pública para mitigar las adversidades que la automatización podría 
producir para las mujeres. La información por presentarse indica que las mujeres de color y 
las mujeres del sur global se encuentran en un mayor riesgo, y que la automatización refuerza 
las desigualdades económicas entre el norte y el sur global. En base a esta información, 
argumento que las propuestas diseñadas por los organismos internacionales mencionados son 
inadecuadas y requieren un enfoque interseccional y de tercer mundo para poder ser 
implementadas alrededor del sur global. 
 
Palabras clave: automatización, tecnofeminismo, feminism tercermundista, segregación 
ocupacional, interseccionalidad, re-entrenamiento. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
Abstract 
 
Industrial automation poses challenges to policymakers as it could lead to long-term 
unemployment and rising inequality. Due to occupational segregation, mainly women work 
in the productive sectors most at risk of becoming robotized. International institutions, 
including the United Nations’ International Labor Organization, the Commission on the 
Status of Women, and the World Economic Forum have outlined policy proposals to curtail 
the adversities that automation poses for women. Data presented throughout the paper shows 
that women of color and women from the global south are particularly at risk, and that 
automation reinforces inequalities between the global north and the global south. In light of 
this data, I contend that the proposals of international fora are inadequate and require both an 
intersectional approach and a third-world perspective in order to be implemented throughout 
the global south. 
 
 
 
Keywords: automation, technofeminism, third-world feminism, occupational segregation, 
intersectionality, reskilling. 
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Introduction 
 
The automation of labor innate to the fourth industrial revolution is expected to be calamitous 
for the attainment of gender equity. Past industrial revolutions have been beneficial for the 
integration of women into the global workforce. If governments fail to maintain a steady and 
equitable supply of employment, the fourth industrial revolution will mark the first instance 
where the achievements made in gender parity may come undone. Productive automation, 
the process in which workplace technologies become upgraded to such an extent that human 
intervention is no longer needed to produce goods and services, is a critical feature of the 
next industrial revolution. The unemployment resulting from this process is a primordial 
concern for policymakers and civil society. Waves of automation have ensued along history, 
reducing the availability of jobs in the short term but amplifying net employment in the long 
term. Contemporary market dynamics and technological innovations are indicative that the 
forthcoming episodes of automation will not only be different from this beneficial pattern, 
but they will additionally be particularly disadvantageous for women. 
The analyses developed throughout this paper determine how the economic disparities 
between regions and between ethnicities make the women-machine conundrum more 
complex. Data reviewed in the following pages argues that (i) the global south will suffer 
from the downturns of automation to a much larger extent than the global north and that (ii) 
prevalent racial discrimination and the racialization of productive sectors make it more likely 
for people of certain ethnicities to be substituted by automation than others. These trends 
evoke inquiries on how both privileged and disadvantaged women from the global south are 
expected to experience, withstand and counteract technological shifts in their workplaces. 
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These inquiries have led me to concern the following research with the role of international 
agencies in the formulation of proposals intended to moderate the adverse results of 
automation on women. From a third-world feminist and technofeminist theoretical stand 
point, this research answers the specific question of whether the proposals reviewed further 
along this article are responsive to the needs of women from non-developed geographies and 
whether they are feasible for implementation in developing countries. 
The methodology implemented is a document review of the following official publishings 
issued by intergovernmental fora and international non-governmental organizations:  
- United Nation’s Commission on the Status of Women: Secretary General’s report 
for the commission’s 55th and 61st sessions. 
- World Economic Forum: “The Future of Jobs: Employment, Skills and Workforce 
Strategy for the Fourth Industrial Revolution”; “The Industry Gender Gap: Women 
and Work in the Fourth Industrial Revolution”; “Global Gender Gap Report: 
Gender Parity and Human Capital”. All of these World Economic Forum reports 
were published in 2016. 
- International Labour Organization: “World Employment and Social Outlook: Trends 
2017.” 
 
This paper evaluates the empirical evidence accumulated by these organisms regarding 
the hazards of automation for women from a macroeconomic outlook. The content of these 
documents is then read from an intersectional and postcolonial/third-world feminist stance, 
questioning the assumptions these organizations subscribe to and formulating a prospective 
debate and research agenda. 
This paper is composed as follows: Section 1 provides an overview on the causal 
mechanisms of automation that result in unemployment and inequality, regardless of gender. 
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Section 2 describes my theoretical inclinations and accentuate the necessity for a feminist 
approach to automation. Section 3 presents empirical findings on the effects of automation 
on women, regardless of class, ethnic, and geographical considerations. Section 4 delineates 
the proposals drafted by international organizations along specific taxonomical 
considerations. Section 5 builds on the specificities of women’s resiliency towards 
technological change, providing evidence as to why a feminist approach is not sufficient, it 
ought to be additionally intersectional and third-world. Section 6 examines the biases of the 
proposals explored in section 4. Section 7 develops a research agenda for automation 
grounded in third-world feminism and Section 8 is a conclusion of my findings. 
 
( 1 ) 
The Scope of Automation 
 
Workers endure their progressive expendability as productive systems become ever more 
self-sufficient. In an automated economy where capital reproduces itself and human labor is 
continuously marginalized from the productive cycle, economic doctrines that have long 
stood unchallenged require intensive reevaluation. As a preface to these reevaluations, I 
ought to overview the consequences of industrial automation, elaborating on how it interacts 
with unemployment and inequality. 
Automated technologies have penetrated a vast share of global markets, producing items 
and performing services with more efficiency than humans at a fraction of the cost. High 
productivity results in unprecedented economic growth, yet other indicators of development, 
such as employment and reduced inequality, have deteriorated. The World Economic 
Forum’s “The Future of Jobs” report estimates that 15 developed nations may face an 
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aggregate loss of more than 5 million jobs by 2020 (2016, 1). The International Labor 
Organization expects a 3.4 million increase in global unemployment in 2017 alone, capping 
at 201 million (2017, 1).  
Technological unemployment, as the trend has been labelled, specially afflicts middle-
skill workers1. Middle-skill workers perform routine tasks and represent the largest share of 
workers in significant industries. Unlike low-skill and high-skill labor2, these routine tasks 
are procedural and rule-based, making them intelligible for digital codification and therefore 
feasible by machines (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003). The middle-skilled, middle class 
workforce in the developed world3, accordingly, is being hollowed out, with workers being 
redistributed to low-income and high-income positions (Goos, Manning, and Salomons 
2009). This phenomenon is known as job polarization or wage polarization.  
There exists, however, substantial literature contesting such effects of automation on 
unemployment. While this paper is not concerned with presenting the debate between 
technopositivist and technopessimist4 scholars, I do recognize that several trends may alter 
the perceived magnitude of the impact of technological unemployment5. However, even if 
future technological unemployment is not as acute as scholars and international institutions 
perceive it to be, what remains unequivocal is that it will regardlessly widen class and gender 
                                                          
1 When in relation to labor, skill levels refer to the amount of education, experience, and specialization workers 
may or may not possess. Middle-skill jobs require education and training beyond a high-school diploma but 
less than a four-year college degree. 
2 For high-skilled professionals, state-of-the-art technologies are complementary rather than substitutive). These 
specialists use automated tools to enhance their performance, diminishing the need for assistants or otherwise 
redundant staff. Low-skill occupations, on the other hand, are not patterned and are abstract rather than routine, 
decreasing their automatability. 
3 Particularly the USA and Europe (and soon the developing world). 
4 Meaning in favor of automation and against it, respectively. 
5 For an in-depth analysis of this debate, see Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003), Brynjolfsson & McAfee (2014), 
and Frey & Osborne (2013). 
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gaps (World Economic Forum, 2016). 
Automation and job polarization have a colossal potential to exacerbate domestic and 
international economic disparities. The World Economic Forum stated that individuals with 
high shares of wealth, income, and skills will most likely see their living standards increase 
and “will benefit from holding more of the assets whose value will be boosted by the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution.” (Baweja et al. 2016, 15). As for middle-skilled workers affected by 
automation, remaining unemployed or transferring to low-skill positions will certainly 
magnify their wage asymmetry vis-a-vis high-skill workers. Internationally, inequality is 
expected to rise between developed and developing nations to the extent that new 
technologies may invert the competitive advantage that emerging markets have had in the 
form of low-cost labor (Baweja et al. 2016, 7). 
 
 ( 2 ) 
Third-World Technofeminism 
 
Contemporary labor and productivity structures are gendered, with women working in 
sectors with higher risks of automation and working against systematic discriminations that 
make the relationship between women and the fourth industrial revolution a troublesome one. 
This section will review different schools of feminist literature and present a detailed analysis 
on how automation is not only gendered, but also counterproductive for female 
empowerment. 
Material feminism is concerned with how capitalism has shaped gender asymmetries. It 
emphasizes the innate problems of the sexual division of labor between private and public 
spaces, advocating for a transformative movement that deconstructs traditional gender roles. 
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Material feminism largely situated female resistance in the rejection of unpaid domestic 
labor. Modern feminist movements have inherited this perspective, partially neglecting the 
discussion of the remaining challenges women face in the economic structures they’re 
embedded in. Unpaid domestic labor, for example, remains a key issue, yet feminist theory 
ought to quickly adapt to the ensuing vectors of gendered oppression, namely 21st century 
industrial automation. Female emancipation through the compensation of domestic labor will 
not be complete without the reduction of the heightened risk women face of becoming 
expelled from the productive economy due to automation. Material feminism, accordingly, 
is likely to converge with technofeminist theory6, considering how current technological 
innovation is not only at the forefront of female emancipation, but most poignantly of female 
disempowerment. The following literature review explores two premises: (i) that the 
development of technology has historically been androcentric7, with men producing a 
discourse of science that marginalizes the voices of women; (ii) and that modern productive 
technologies could worsen the inequalities under capitalism. This review accordingly links 
technofeminism, socialist feminism, and third-world feminism. 
Women’s relation to technology has been problematic for most of history. Critical 
perspectives have questioned the biases in knowledge-making processes, deeming western 
science to be permeated by archetypal masculinity and inherent androcentricity (Hartsock 
1983; Keller 1985; Merchant 1980). Androcratic discourses have constructed technology as 
an exclusively male project by disassociating feminine practices from the notion of scientific 
knowledge. Knowledge equates to expertise, intelligence and professionalism. Female 
                                                          
6 Technofeminist theory succinctly posits that technology is gendered and interacts with gender relations. 
7 Androcentricity refers to the practice of masculinizing the world view of individuals and societies, implying 
a marginalization of feminine points of view. 
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intelligence and knowledge is still disregarded in numerous nations, ultimately leading to the 
forging of glass ceilings and a sexual division of work. These asymmetries in knowledge are 
key to understanding how technology reinforces male power and how automation poses a 
particular threat for women. 
Male predominance in the consumption and the development of technologies raises 
concerns regarding technology’s role as a medium to alter power relations between genders. 
Cockburn (1985), McNeil (1987), Webster (1989), among others constitute a robust body of 
work supporting the thesis that the notions of femininity and technical expertise are weighed 
as incompatible by hegemonic sexist discourses. Thus, gender and technology partake in 
dialogues of mutual configuration, leading technofeminist theory to invite us to understand 
technology as both a source and a consequence of gender relations, and thereby of gender 
inequality (Wajcman 2006, 15). 
Einsenstein uses the term “capitalist patriarchy” to illustrate an integrated system of 
domination where capital (technology) is dominated by men, emphasizing “the existing 
mutual dependence of the capitalist class structure and male supremacy” (1977, 3). A feature 
of such globalized, androcentric and capitalist economy is the predominance of masculinity 
as a determinant factor of the direction that technological innovations will take. Such 
predominance is a consequence of having few women studying and working in industries of 
technological innovation. If men either consciously or unconsciously reproduce sexism while 
defining the purposes of technology and setting the accessibility of technology, capitalist 
development will continue to serve male interests at the expense of female empowerment. 
Feminist movements have occasionally regarded technology as a source of emancipation (see 
Firestone, 1970). However, without a dismantling of structural sexism, modern innovations 
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may further obstruct women’s opportunities, as is the case with automation the prospective 
feminization of the world’s unemployed.  
A final addition to this theoretical discussion is the role of third-world feminism. Third-
world feminism (also referred to as postcolonial feminism) links sexism with international 
relations theory such as Dependency Theory and World Systems Theory, arguing that efforts 
of female empowerment can be aided with efforts against neocolonialism and 
neoimperialism. Globalization lies at the very essence of international political economy. It 
is unquestionable that most nations are interlinked, for better or for worse, in a set of 
asymmetrical relations (see for example Galeano, 1997). The analyses of automation, female 
precariousness and empowerment are inextricable from this reality. Third-world feminism 
emerges as a response to current interregional relations. The approach developed here shares 
third-world feminism’s interest in unraveling the power dynamics of western hegemony, 
multinational capital, dependency models, and the positionality of unprivileged women 
residing within the ever-changing contours of what constitutes the “third world” (Mohanty, 
Russo, and Torres 1991). 
Standpoint feminist theory posits that the fabrication of knowledge is indivisible from 
each theorists’ ideological propensities and identities8 . This research project is formulated 
from a socialist feminist standpoint, in the sense that the problem of automation and the 
industrial exclusion of women is framed under the larger problems of wealth disparity and 
uneven ownership of the means of production. This theoretical stance is compounded by an 
intersectional and third-world feminist approach, exploring the complexities of class, race, 
                                                          
8 See, for example, the work of Patricia Hill Collins (2002) on black feminism or Sonya Andermahr, Terry 
Lovell, and Carol Wolkowitz ‘s review of feminist theories (1997).  
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and geographical distinctions among women and their relation to automation under 
neoliberalism. 
  
( 3 ) 
Mainstreaming Gender into the Robot Discussion 
 
Feminist movements in developed and emerging economies have made remarkable advances 
regarding the inclusion of women into high-skill occupations, yet glass ceilings worldwide 
remain unshattered and women account for a disproportionate share of middle-skill workers, 
particularly in the economic sectors set to be profoundly changed by automation. The 
processes that keep most women in middle-to-low-skill professions are both overtly and 
covertly sexist in nature. To the extent that these workplace disadvantages may snowball in 
the fourth industrial revolution, it is evident that policymaking concerned with future 
workforce planning, social security warranties, education and parity must situate gender 
mainstreaming at its core. This section outlines the varied ways in which automation is 
increasingly harmful for women, showing that the largest international organisms have 
included gender mainstreaming in their agendas. 
 The relation between enterprise leadership and womanhood must be factored in to unravel 
the asymmetrical effects of automation. Glass ceilings have undermined women’s abilities 
to access high-skill positions at the executive level. Additionally, motherhood concessions 
(if they exist at all) account for shorter work hours that unjustifiably tax a high mobility 
penalty on women. These elements produce a lack of diversity in women’s management 
opportunities, which becomes a self-reinforcing vicious cycle to the extent that women are 
incapacitated to develop their own management experience. Women thus remain relegated 
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in middle-to-low-skill jobs with higher chances of being relinquished to automation.  
Occupational segregation by gender is another significant problem. Manufacturing-
production and office-administration are two female-predominant industries that will be 
certainly reconfigured by the fourth industrial revolution (World Economic Forum 2016b, 
5). Mainly women may be disenfranchised by automation in these sectors, as two thirds of 
the expected 7.1 million job losses over the next five years will occur in office and 
administration areas (World Economic Forum 2016, 1). In a striking finding, the World 
Economic Forum reported that four million men are expected to face job losses in the next 
ten years compared to 1.4 million gains; one job gained for every three lost. Women, on the 
other hand, will lose only 3 million jobs but will gain just 0.55 million, amounting to five 
jobs lost for every job gained (World Economic Forum 2016b, 6).  
Labor trends, however, do not all point to the same bleak direction for women. In fact, the 
contemporary shifting dynamics of some markets are set to open vast amounts of job 
positions that have been traditionally female. One example is the expected growth of 
healthcare jobs and healthcare practitioners in the United States of America, with 2.3 million 
workers of both sectors combined needed throughout the coming decade, representing 1 out 
of 4 new jobs (United States Department of Labor, 2017). In fact, the healthcare and social 
assistance sector is expected to become the largest employing major sector during the decade 
(United States Department of Labor, 2017). As the most populous generations worldwide 
will come into retirement age, these trends will replicate in most developed and developing 
nations with similar demographic compositions. 
Automation, moreover, is projected to de-structure gender roles in the care industry. As 
men become partially phased out of other sectors and substituted by machines, care work 
appears as a promising alternative to avoid unemployment. Care jobs have remained 
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chronically underpaid, particularly due to the gender unbalance in this industry. A stream of 
male labor into care services could defeminize the industry and push forward a movement 
for higher and more equitable wages within the sector. 
Automation has the potential to acutely alter the relation between capital owners and the 
working class. In its core, the process of automation entails a replacement of human labor for 
capital (in the form of machine labor), meaning that revenues are no longer distributed among 
workers, but funneled directly towards capital owners. The benefits of automation are 
expected to be distributed unevenly among genders given that a significant amount of capital 
owners are men rather than women. This is due to the fact that 35% of countries have 
“somewhat restrictive legislation in place to regulate women’s access to financial services… 
(and) the number of countries with highly restricted rights of inheritance (for women) is much 
higher, (standing) at 18%.” (World Economic Forum, 2016c). Additionally, due to the gender 
wage gap that favors men, they have more saving capacity than women9, allowing them to 
undertake significantly more investments and thus earn higher superannuation returns or 
establish their own businesses. Automation could further polarize the economic gender gap 
to the extent that it could allow men to own more capital through the use of robots than 
women are able to.  
Gendered job segregation is expected to trigger further inequalities as age of automation 
will prompt unprecedented growth in the areas of science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics (abbreviated as STEM), which has been overwhelmingly saturated by men. In 
fact, “one area in which women continue to remain under-represented is among STEM 
graduates, for which the global gender gap stands at 47%, with 30% of all male students 
                                                          
9 It takes women more effort to achieve the same savings level as men in a similar occupation since men are 
paid higher wages than women who do the same type and amount of work. 
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graduating from STEM subjects, in contrast to 16% of all female students.” (World Economic 
Forum, 2016c). Thus, not only are women circumscribed within jobs with high automatable 
risks, but they are also underrepresented in the few economic sectors prone to prosper the 
most with the advent of new technologies. 
Another instance of this phenomenon is ICT. Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) will develop at outstanding rates considering the prominence of big data 
and the internet of things10. Participation in the industries associated with ICT and digital 
work are demographically skewed in terms of gender. In developing countries, men are 2.7 
times more likely than women to work in the sector and 7.6 times more likely to be in ICT 
occupations (World Bank 2016, 106). It would be expected that developed countries had a 
narrower gender gap in terms of ICT representation and internet accessibility, yet this does 
not hold true. In Europe, there are 3 times more men than women holding a degree in ICT, 
and 5 times more men than women work in this sector (Directorate General for the 
Information Society and Media, 2013). 
The prevalent exclusion of women in ICT and STEM fields entails much more stark 
problems than them being unable to earn large amounts of income in these blooming 
industries. Virtual reality, artificial intelligence, the internet of things, big data, and 
cyborgization technologies11 will profoundly restructure the way human societies develop. 
As did the revolutions before, the fourth industrial revolution will alter the most infinitesimal 
detail of our future. It is in STEM and ICT fields where the decisions regarding what form 
                                                          
10 The Internet of Things refers to the ability of “smart objects” to establish a network between each other and 
transfer data through the internet. A “smart home” is an example of an Internet of Things network.  
Big data, on the other hand, is a voluminous amount of data that requires specialized software and hardware 
to be processed and understood. Consumption analysis is a field where big data is used and helps companies 
determine the purchasing trends of consumers. 
11 Cyborgization technologies are understood as devices that can be integrated with the human body to 
improve its functions. 
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these details may take are made. If women remain cast out of these fields, societies face the 
threat of having technologies become increasingly androcentric.  
These issues are not future-specific, as some problems are already present in technological 
developments. The predominance of men in boardrooms and in the interface development 
positions of leading technology markets have already been questioned due to their 
engendering of commonplace technologies. Apple’s Siri, Amazon’s Alexa, Microsoft’s 
Cortana, and Google’s Home Assistant, for example, are all virtual helpers that have been 
programmed as feminine in spite of their disembodied technologies. To program these 
assistants with female voices is to reinforce female stereotypes and to portray even “virtual 
women” in secondary assisting roles rather than in more empowering representations. Even 
more severely, a lack of female participation in programming software algorithms may 
stagnate the feminist quest of ensuring gender parity. According to a study designed by 
Carnegie Mellon University, employment pages operating through Google ads showed high-
paying job ads to a male group of users much more frequently than to females (Datta, 
Tschantz, and Datta 2015). 
These processes of female disempowerment are intricate and require integral solutions 
executed by a wide array of stakeholders. This research streamlines the following section 
among one of the specific type of stakeholder: international organizations. I seek to outline 
an overview of the policy measures drafted by a selection of prominent international agencies 
such as the International Labour Organization, UN Women, and the World Economic Forum. 
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( 4 ) 
The State of Affairs of Automation Prescriptions 
 
Feminist movements undergo a continuous yet unceasing process of renewal. From the 
suffragists and “liberal feminists” to the third-wave intersectional feminists, the movements 
have demanded their requests to be included in international agendas so that woman are not 
left behind. Current feminist concerns on the fourth industrial revolution have already been 
discussed in international fora. Several policy plans have been designed to aid nations in 
discerning what paths to tread in order to mitigate the effects of automation on women. 
Notice, however, that the premise of female inclusion is problematized since the forthcoming 
solutions lack a truly intersectional12 and critical foundation. This chapter explores some of 
the proposed alternatives, especially those framed under female education, corporate 
leadership, and entrepreneurship.  
 
4.1 ) Education 
Reforming educational systems is the most feasible alternative for public governments to 
close gender gaps. In developing nations where automation is especially detrimental and 
where gender discrimination stands unchallenged, governments are pressured to guarantee 
proper and leveled education for all social groups. The global south is partially composed of 
nations with low enrollment rates in school. Girls are particularly of deprived of education 
as the males are disproportionately selected to attend school13. Governments ought to 
                                                          
12 By intersectionality I mean the analytical method of understanding how class, race, gender, religion, 
sexuality, among other categories may interact with each other to produce specific social problems. 
13 This phenomenon is not exclusive to developing nations. Developed countries where some forms of sexism 
are still prevalent, like China and Japan, also observe educational gender disparities. 
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improve their efforts to provide public universal education, focusing on creating incentives 
for young girls who quit school due to pregnancy. 
 To the extent that tertiary education reproduces gender stereotypes, thereby affecting 
the gender proportion of certain job groups, governments are required to establish strategic 
alliances with academia and companies to achieve two goals: (i) elaborate communicational 
campaigns to counter the underrepresentation of women in male-dominated industries and 
(ii) design internship programmes that favor female graduates’ opportunity to work in areas 
with low female representation. These measures are a priority considering that such 
occupational segregation threatens to exclude women from participating in some of the most 
promising economic sectors of the future, which is currently male-dominated. 
The G20 countries have taken a right step in this direction. Among the agreed strategies 
for implementation between these countries exist fostering women’s interest in STEM 
careers and facilitating female STEM graduates access to training networks, bolstered by 
incentives for the private sector to hire female STEM graduates, trainees, and apprentices. 
The United Nation’s Commission on the Status of Women (UNCSW) additionally proposes 
that states should “Develop or strengthen policies and programmes to support the multiple 
roles of women in society, including in the fields of science and technology, in order to 
increase women’s and girls’ access to education, training, science and technology” (United 
Nations Commission on the Status of Women 2011, 10). 
4.2 ) Access to Leadership 
Efforts must be sustained to attain gender parity in leadership positions in the global 
private sector. As the fourth industrial revolution unravels, companies will start a process of 
crucial decisionmaking regarding the adoption of automated technologies and labor market 
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policies. In order to guarantee that these decisions do not particularly harm women, it is 
critical for boardrooms to include of empowered women in decisionmaking departments. 
Previous attempts to enhance female leadership have been effective, yet leadership gender 
gaps remain sizable (World Economic Forum 2016c). 
The World Economic Forum has elaborated the blueprint for a six-point plan to guide the 
private sector into including and empowering women (2016b, 7-8). Among the six strategies, 
two of them are targeted to break the glass ceiling in leadership spaces. 
Notable areas for improvement are accountability and transparency. Recruitment 
processes among companies are rarely held into scrutiny, allowing gender selection biases. 
Additionally, career paths require more transparency so that workers may clearly see 
promotion possibilities. Women are often stuck in career that do not lead to management 
positions, a situation that could be reduced if companies had a transparent recruitment 
process. The second keystone for managerial parity identified by the World Economic Forum 
is direct leadership intervention within companies, consisting of supporting women already 
in managerial positions, establishing diversity departments, and constantly communicating 
in favor of gender through equality workshops or campaigns focused on gender parity 
(2016b, 8). 
Two of the other paths of action singled out by the World Economic Forum are not 
straightforwardly related to leadership, yet they are promising alternatives for helping women 
overcome labor obstacles and improve career advancement. One of them is achieving work-
life balance as an imperative measure to be achieved on a global level. Women’s performance 
is often interrupted due to caregiving responsibilities, making it essential for legislators to 
implement policies that mitigate the penalties that women face due to motherhood. Secondly, 
prioritizing gender parity as a component of corporative social responsibility plans may yield 
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valuable results. Enterprises have imparted gender diversity trainings and support for their 
partner companies which are led by women. Exercising influence to push for gender-neutral 
or gender-positive career advertisement is also a promising social responsibility endeavor 
that companies should undertake. 
 
4.3 ) Entrepreneurship 
If large and medium-sized firms automate their human capital, women may thrive in 
small-sized entrepreneurial settings14. The internet and online selling platforms, for example, 
could allow women to establish their own businesses. Prior to the internet boom of 
merchandising, the high capital costs for setting up businesses discouraged women from 
becoming entrepreneurs. However, female entrepreneurship still remains unattainable in 
impoverished areas where there is no internet connectivity. Additionally, a lack of access to 
capital is a poignant issue in these demographics. Sexist work structures place women mainly 
in part-time jobs and informal jobs, greatly hampering their credit prospects. Women in full-
time formal jobs are also less likely to access the same amount of credit loans than men due 
to the fact that pregnancies and childcare reduce job stability, which is a key criterion for 
loaning in banks and other agencies. For female entrepreneurs, earning the capital needed to 
launch their businesses is burdensome, as loaning agencies tend not to invest in companies 
that are not owned by men or that do not have male partners in their boardrooms.  
Online tools are indispensable to overcome sexist patterns in entrepreneurship. An 
estimated 13 to 18 billion dollars could be added to annual GDP across 144 developing 
countries if twice as many women were online and had access to internet (Watson et al. 2012, 
                                                          
14 Small-sized firms are also capable of engaging in automation processes, but the capital costs of doing so are 
too high to manage in most cases. 
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12). Additionally, 140 million jobs could be created in emerging markets by aiding people’s 
access to ICT, especially in the most underserved geographies (Deloitte 2014, 3). Therefore, 
states should revise their development budget to make funds available for digital 
development projects. Local governments should additionally approach banks and loaning 
institutions to provide gender sensibility trainings. Finally, governments could issue 
incentives for the loaning institutions that prioritize female entrepreneurs.  
 
4.4 ) Others 
There is a variety of other decisive measures capable of balancing gender disparities 
during the fourth industrial revolution that may not be grouped within the clear-cut categories 
detailed above. The United Nations Commission on the Status of Women has developed 
recommendations along the lines of international aid. Developing nations ought to employ 
foreign assistance funds in an effective and gender-responsive fashion to promote women’s 
empowerment in unstable labor structures. Among the initiatives where such funds ought to 
be invested, the commission highlights expanding the scope of education and training 
opportunities in science, technology, engineering and mathematics, in information and 
communications technology and digital fluency, and enhance women’s participation as users, 
content creators, employees, entrepreneurs, innovators and leaders (United Nations 
Commission on the Status of Women 2017, 15). 
The recommendations selected here for discussion are not representative of the entire body 
of strategies being designed to counter the potential risks of automation, but they are 
appropriate proxies for analysis. The following sections lay out important data that leads to 
the argument that these recommendations lack important additions such as an intersectional 
and third-world approach. 
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( 5 ) 
An Intersectional and Third-World Feminist Approach to Automation 
 
Mainstreaming gender is a key analytical vector to determine how present and future 
technologies will either shift or reinforce oppression. However, it is only a component of the 
vast number of tasks at hand. Striding towards female emancipation requires intersecting 
womanhood in the fourth industrial revolution with the neighboring compasses of race, 
ethnicity, class, and geography. This section explores the mutually-reinforcing racial and 
class vulnerabilities of women in three aspects: national and transnational domestic work, 
education access to quality employment, and labor relations between the global north and 
south. 
Mainstream feminist discourses15 emphasize the positive aspects of automation for female 
emancipation while they overlook how it may unevenly disempower low-paid female 
domestic workers. Household automation holds the positive potential to diminish the share 
of unpaid housework women do16, yet only women with a higher economic status may be 
able to afford these technologies. Class differences among women could be exacerbated in 
the fourth industrial revolution. Household automation affects paid domestic workers 
negatively. There are 53 million domestic workers worldwide, out of which 83% are women 
(United Nations Commission on the Status of Women 2017, 11). Increasing technological 
progress in the household would render domestic workers nonessential to the extent that 
automatic ironing devices, automatic kitchens, drone floor cleaners, drone grass mowers 
                                                          
15 Such as the optimistic line of thinking developed by Shulamith Firestone in “The Dialetic of Sex” (1970) 
16 Dishwashers, slow cookers, washing and drying machines are examples of how automated devices have 
already reduced the unpaid domestic labor women perform. 
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among other devices may displace domestic workers.  Domestic work is one of the biggest 
job markets for low-skilled women (Tayah, 2016). When displaced, low-paid female workers 
may endure unemployment since there are comparatively no other female-specific low-skill 
markets as large as domestic work. 
Domestic work has helped shape the relation between the global north and south and 
between urban and rural demographics. The demand for domestic work in the global north is 
primarily fulfilled by migrant women from developing nations (Chaney, 1991; Nisha, 
2007)17. These women are motivated to migrate to wealthier nations due to severe economic 
constraints in their home countries. Domestic work does not lead to career advancement and 
large proportions of what these women earn are remitted to these women’s families in their 
home countries18 (Pettman 2010, 257). Similar patterns are observed in domestic work within 
each nation, as the demand for domestic work in wealthy cities throughout Africa, Asia and 
Latin America is fulfilled by women in rural areas who wish to improve their living standards 
but who do not earn enough to achieve social mobility (International Labour Office 2013, 1-
2). Transnational and internal migrant domestic workers thus remain in a precarious low-
income status. Domestic work is thus gendered, racialized, and is markedly an issue of class 
to the extent that both rural areas and the global south are related to non-whiteness and 
“underdevelopment”. This racialized and gendered configuration of domestic work 
ultimately situates poor women of color in risk of technological unemployment and could 
thus severely alter the current trends in migration and in care work. 
 
                                                          
17 These authors respectively explicit how domestic workers in the United States are mostly Latina women, 
and how most domestic workers across the middle east are African or South Asian. 
18 The automation of domestic labor as such may not only lower the living standards of migrant women, but 
also of their families in their origin countries should remittances plummet. 
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These scenarios are not irreparable. Household chores are not the only fuel for the demand 
of domestic work. Caretaking accounts for a large proportion of domestic work. The 
continuous growth of the care economy is capable of outbalancing technological 
unemployment. Automatable chores may make domestic work less necessary, but looking 
after children and the elderly is not an automatable task in the present.  
Although the effects of automation on the demand of domestic work is contestable, it 
poses dissimilar unemployment threats for different ethnicities and races in non-care 
industries. In the United States, for example, the American Institute for Spatial Economic 
Analysis illustrates how 61.4 percent of Hispanics in the US workforce could be replaced by 
advanced machinery, yet they only represent 16.7 percent of the total working population 
(Chen, 2017). African American populations represent 11.9 percent of the workforce, yet 
55.2 percent of them risk technological unemployment. Educational attainment is a 
significant in understanding how ethnicity intersects with technological unemployment. 
Workers with a PhD are six times less likely to risk automation unemployment than workers 
without a high school degree (ibid). The risk of unemployment decreases as educational 
attainment progresses. A high school degree “reduces automation risk by roughly 6 percent, 
some college by 10 percent relative to a high school degree, an associate’s degree by 13 
percent relative to some college, a bachelor’s by 23 percent, a master’s by 40 percent and a 
doctorate by almost 50 percent relative to a master’s degree.” (ibid). Considering that 
Hispanics and blacks enroll in college at lower rates than whites (U.S Department of 
Education, 2011), they are at a higher risk of working in automatable positions.  
The deficient American educational system has been unable to surmount the structural 
inequalities embedded in its society, with automation now threatening to further cripple the 
economic prospects of those already marginalized from the privileges of education. The 
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youth, Hispanics, blacks and women will all concomitantly endure heightened technological 
unemployment due to their restricted access to education. Women in particular are “more 
than twice as likely as men to lose a job that is highly automatable” (ibid)19. Interpreted as a 
group, the statistics reviewed above single out lower-middle-class to poor women from non-
white ethnicities as the most vulnerable towards technological unemployment.  
In addition to intersectional feminism, third-world feminism is necessary to understand 
how international policies ought to be shaped in a future of scarcer labor. The fourth 
industrial revolution will potentially alter global linkages and the job market relation between 
developed and developing nations in fields other than domestic work20. The global south 
stands at yet another circumstance of power asymmetry. Reports estimate that the share of 
jobs susceptible to automation is higher in developing countries than in developed nations: 
around two-thirds of jobs (Baweja et al, 2016). This is due to the fact that emerging market 
economies have not directly endured the challenges of being industrially revolutionized. The 
World Economic Forum’s White Paper on extreme automation and connectivity 
appropriately elaborates on this conundrum: 
 
(Developing countrie’s) output and employment are still largely driven by 
agriculture, small-scale manufacturing and lowskilled services, large parts of 
which are in the informal economy. These are economies with low capital stock 
and high population growth rates. They will face the threat of the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution compromising lowskilled jobs via extreme automation, 
but may not have the technological ability to enjoy the relative gains that could 
be re-distributed via extreme connectivity. (Baweja et al. 2016, 26) 
 
                                                          
19 According to the same source, “Hispanics are 25 percent more likely than Whites to lose their jobs to 
automation. For African Americans, this number is 13 percent.” (Chen, 2017). 
20 For example, multinational companies in developed countries may reshore their manufacturing processes, 
leading to a massive loss of jobs in the developing nations that hosted off-shored production.  
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Developing economies that once possessed the relative competitive advantage of abundant 
low-skill labor will face challenges as business firms cut costs by replacing such labor with 
advanced technologies (Baweja et al. 2016, 21). The situation of women in sweatshops across 
the global south, for example, becomes further intractable in circumstances where 
automation is easily adopted by transnational enterprises. There have been important 
breakthroughs for fair trade, as countries that host the outsourced production of developed 
nations have committed to achieve economic justice for these women by negotiating wages 
with transnational corporations. The mainstreaming of automation and the subsequent 
reduction of its costs, however, may make it more palatable for multinationals to invest in 
automation instead of increasing the wages of the workers in their outsourced supply chains. 
The progress made so far to economically empower low-skilled women in developing 
regions faces decisive challenges. Research has shown that the business process outsourcing 
(BPO) industry in the Philippines, for example, holds a substantial amount of its jobs at risk 
of automation; this affects women as they comprise almost 60% of the industry (Faith 2017, 
3). Most specifically, the women that comprise 70% or more of the workers in the garment 
manufacturing industry of Southeast Asia are vulnerable to displacement by robots (Faith 
2017, 3). 
The gender dimension of automation is also a dimension of class, race, and international 
political economy. As the studies reviewed in this section show, economically 
underprivileged women and women from the developing world may not only be incapable 
of harnessing the benefits of automation, but also find themselves in an exacerbated state of 
threat to their livelihoods by the fourth industrial revolution. Women in off-shored industries, 
domestic workers, women with low income and low educational attainment are at a marked 
disadvantage.  
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( 6 ) 
A Critical Stance Towards Policy Proposals 
 
The policy guidelines recommended by the ILO, the World Economic Forum, and the United 
Nations’ Commission on the Status of Women designed to mitigate the risks of automation 
are hardly applicable to the global south. Their recommendations are not attentive to the 
economic problems which emerging and underdeveloped markets are likely to experience. 
The incompatibilities between international guidelines and political economies in the global 
south urge us to reevaluate the available options to surmount automation, locating women 
and advanced technologies at the heart of the discussion. 
The proposals regarding the granting of universal public education and reskilling 
programs designed to level women’s skills are particularly problematic. Developed nations 
could draft robot taxes21 that could be invested in public services such as free education, 
including programs to help workers acquire new skills if their previous skillset is no longer 
compatible with labor needs. Developing economies, on the other hand, exhibit a much 
narrower capacity to apply and invest taxes on automated industries22. The main obstacle for 
these economies is that multinationals that choose to automate may freely migrate between 
nations if taxes on robots between these nations are substantially different. A first possible 
scenario sees most enterprises choosing to produce goods in the developing nation(s) with 
the least amount of taxation placed on robots. A second scenario sees developing nations 
managing to combine robot taxes with protectionist measures in order to avoid enterprises 
                                                          
21 These are taxes laid upon robot capital itself or upon the products these robots produce. 
22 Taxation systems on robots can take on a vast variety of forms. The capability of nations to implement tax 
schemes depends on effectively managing the macroeconomic and microeconomic effects of different tax 
combinations. 
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migrating while simultaneously taxing automated production and investing in reskilling 
programs. Although this scenario remains a possibility (albeit an improbable one), the 
volume of workers requiring reskilling is substantially higher in developing nations than in 
developed nations, reducing the feasibility of deploying taxes for these programs23. 
Policymakers also ought to bear in mind that education is not an all-encompassing solution 
for female unemployment. Providing women with higher education was a meant to help 
access to managerial positions, yet female representation in decision-making areas has 
remained low in spite of high educational progress. In fact, “Even though there is near gender 
parity in employment for professional and technical workers, … women hold less than a third 
of senior roles” (World Economic Forum 2016c). Additionally, there is a disconnect between 
the remaining educational gender gap (standing at 5%) and the economic gender gap 
(standing at 41%) (World Economic Forum 2016c). Women’s skills are being leveled, yet 
they still face sexist discrimination in terms of access to formal work, equal salaries, and 
managerial positions. These challenges question the net impact of education on employment. 
Further studies are needed to determine whether reskilling programs aimed at women will 
truly surmount sexist work structures already in place. 
Complementary education such as reskilling and upskilling programmes should be mainly 
deployed through public means. Leaving the supply of these programmes to the private sector 
could further disempower underprivileged women without the economic means to enroll in 
their required courses. With the increasing costs of global educational debts, it is uncertain 
whether people earning low and middle incomes will be able to even afford complementary 
                                                          
 
 
 32 
education after their third-level degree, especially if automation threatens their economic 
stability and their yearly wage24. Government subsidies for these courses are a necessary 
expenditure for equality.  
The recommendations evaluated above are counterintuitive to the economic models these 
countries may develop in the future given the dynamics of the fourth industrial revolution. 
The institutional guidelines provided by these organizations would need nations to increase 
the size of their governmental apparatuses in some form or another if the goal is to mitigate 
automation’s impact on women. The establishment of a third-degree public education 
system, for example, would require considerable expenses. The aforementioned fact that 
emerging and underdeveloped economies are expected to become less competitive and thus 
poorer during the fourth industrial revolution makes the expansion of government an 
unattainable task since economic prosperity and high commerce revenues are needed for the 
increase of government size. 
These challenges hamper policymaker’s ability to discern what decisions to make. In spite 
of the convoluted set of problems and possible solutions, a certain alternative is lobbying 
with governments to guarantee the elimination of laws that cripple female empowerment. 
155 countries still uphold at least one gender-based restriction for employment and 
entrepreneurship (United Nations Commission on the Status of Women 2017, 4), making the 
revision of sexist legislature an important measure. 
Civil society and the private sector may also provide valuable alternatives to foster female 
empowerment. Female worker unions are crucial to seize political power and communicate 
the demands of women regarding their vulnerability in the circumstances of the fourth 
                                                          
24 The issue is a priority for countries where private education outweighs public education. 
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industrial revolution. Formulating a clear script of action to reject the further 
disempowerment of women is key for worker unions worldwide. As for the private sector, 
companies from the global south ought to strengthen their commitments to female leadership 
and inclusion through regional associations with partner companies. These associations are 
useful in establishing general goals and targets for women’s empowerment and producing 
incentives to advance the companies’ interests through the diversification of their workforce. 
To a large degree, the reports from the United Nation’s agencies and the World Economic 
Forum are not negligible omissions of the global south and disadvantaged women, but are 
rather deliberate in their specific focus on the global north. This is mainly due to the fact that 
the fourth industrial revolution is still in its infancy and its effects on global economic 
structures remain to be set off in their entirety. The formulation of proposals for the global 
south in the presence of automation require an exhaustive amount of data. In order for 
intergovernmental organizations to produce sound alternatives for public policy management 
in the global south, a series of institutional partnerships, global-scale research agendas and 
research plans must be agreed upon and executed with immediacy. The following section 
details upon these suggestions. 
 
 ( 7 ) 
Limitations to this Study and a Future Research Agenda 
 
This paper sought to discuss the policy options endorsed by international fora to curb the 
disadvantageous results that massive productive automation will exert on women. The 
foundational assumptions that underlie the formulation of these policies have been critically 
addressed by examining their biases and their incompatibilities with the alternatives that are 
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feasible, focusing mainly on education. There are methodological and empirical limitations 
that may have hampered the fulfilling of these research goals to varying degrees. This section 
elaborates upon these probable limitations. 
The availability of interdisciplinary data and literature is seriously challenged. An 
important issue is the lack of case studies assessing how automation is morphing gendered 
labor patterns in the developing world. Reports by international agencies have illustrated a 
general outline of how automation is set to heterogeneously affect different nations and 
demographical groups. International organizations have effectively deployed statistical 
information in these reports, generating awareness on the scope of the problem. What is 
lacking in academic knowledge is a thorough analysis on the technological and economic 
causal mechanisms that foster female disempowerment and their social consequences 
overall. 
The studies presented by the Institute for Spatial Economic Analysis, for example, 
statistically demonstrate how being African-American, young, and female highly increase 
the probabilities of becoming substituted by a machine. The methodology for the data 
collection, however, is exclusively quantitative, implying that their seemingly intersectional 
results are not intersectional, only additive. The institute’s methodology generates an 
aggregate rate of the risk of technological automation, adding the rates by race, by gender, 
and by age. However, it fails to elucidate how these effects should not be simply added, but 
they should be analyzed on how these vectors interact with each other and with effects of 
automation. The same principle applies to the women from diverse ethnicities, social classes, 
and professions in the developing world. The emerging field of technofeminist research must 
urgently develop a qualitative research agenda that investigates the experiences of these 
women. This approach could improve researcher’s capacity to unveil the details of how 
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different racial, economic, and geographical positionalities lead women to experience 
automation heterogeneously.  
In light of the need for qualitative data, the responsibilities for academia and researchers 
are broad. There is the need for interdisciplinary and transnational partnerships to produce 
in-depth knowledge of automation and female precariousness. Additionally, academia could 
function as a medium for the coordination of multi-stakeholder response plans to counter the 
negative effects of automation (Faith 2017, 3). Such transnational and interdisciplinary 
practices are vital to address this insufficiency of empirical knowledge in the area. 
Professionals in these partnerships ought to incorporate these queries in their research 
agendas:  
How does culture and religion interact with women’s access to the use of technology in 
different geographies? 
How should Universal Basic Income experiments be carried out and evaluated in a way 
that gender and class specificities are approached?  
How does automation effect emerging economies and the women in them, considering the 
fact that emerging economies remain understudied? 
How may tax systems on robots be set up in a social responsible way where 
underprivileged women are prioritized? 
 
This list is in no regard exhaustive, yet the queries refer to priority fields of research. The 
fourth industrial revolution brings forth an array of possibilities for theoretical research, yet 
I’ve contended throughout this research piece that the development of a feminist, third-world, 
and intersectional theory of automation is of utmost priority. The research agenda of scholars 
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and institutions alike would benefit from incorporating these theoretical junctions in their 
discussions. 
 
( 8 ) 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The fourth industrial revolution presents an opportunity for feminist movements to galvanize 
themselves and help amend the shortcomings of structural sexism. This research has detailed 
the nature of such shortcomings, paying particular attention to how preexisting work 
structures articulate with automation to economically impair women from developing 
nations. Occupational segregation by gender, lack of access to leadership positions, unequal 
participation in STEM and ICT fields among others constitute some of these shortcomings. 
International organizations such as the World Economic Forum, the International Labour 
Organization, among others are responsive to the multiple complications women endure 
while encompassed by the effects of automation. These organizations ground their strategies 
around inconclusive premises. Entrenched in a technofeminist, third-world, and 
intersectional theoretical site of enunciation, this paper argues that their proposals are both 
partially inattentive to the class and racial positionalities of women, and unobservant of the 
discordances between their strategies and the circumstances required for their 
implementation throughout the global south. 
It is of utmost necessity that national governments and civil societies alike become aware 
of gendered implications of automation in order to discontinue the androcentricity that 
governs technological innovation. Otherwise, the male gaze may remain as the perpetual 
shaper of the world’s technical future, distributing the gains of andromation among men 
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while eroding the past achievements of women movements the world over. National 
governments will be ill-equipped to truly cater to the needs of all women if the guidelines 
provided by international organizations are skewed to benefit only the already privileged 
proportion of women from the global north. There is the need for further research on the 
theoretical and empirical specificities of the symbiosis of women and automated technology 
within the global south in order to elaborate sound and inclusive policies to protect female 
labor and the future of womanhood. 
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